

The gospel of the universal science

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The Latin word *ars* (art), like the Greek word *techné* (technique), was used, in both Classical Times and the Middle Ages, to refer to the knowledge of the rules by which people could implement the different skills required for a specific productive activity. Accordingly, people said the “art of making shoes or horseshoes” and, similarly, “the art of painting”, “the art of sculpture” or “the art of poetry”, because these activities were not considered to differ substantially from each other. From this viewpoint, one may ask - as did Socrates with regard to cookery, according to *Gorgias* by Plato, whether every type of productive activity can become an art form.

Yet, it was considered that anything that could be made artistically could be made in a non artistic way as well. Thus, health, for instance, could be attained or restored either by means of a set of principles (those of *ars medica*) or by applying a series of merely empiric, asystematic skills or knowledge. In any case, people concerned with these topics most often agreed that performing such activities artistically was much better than performing them in a non artistic way. Lull’s concept of Art was in line with this statement. The Illuminist Doctor devised an art aimed at converting unbelievers: a method that would enable missionaries to act in accordance with a series of specific rules and principles. Lull felt that, without adhering to such rules and principles, missionaries were unable to efficiently preach, teach and, in particular, discuss.

In several Chapters of *The Book of Contemplation* (1273-1274?), Lull reflects on the requirements for an art of interreligious dialogue, and tries to establish a set of rules. These attempts resulted in the compilation entitled *Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem* (c. 1274).¹ This *Ars* –the first of Lull’s four major Arts– was intended to be a handbook for teaching and learning. It contained essential notions of the discipline it was concerned with and was designed to be useful for quick reference.

As is usually the case with handbooks, the title coincided with the content. However, in this case, the title also referred (not by chance) to the name of another discipline that was well known in the Arts Faculties of medieval universities, namely Dialectics, which traditionally used to be termed

ars inveniendi. It is known that Dialectics was studied by reading *Topics*, that is, the Aristotelian work dealing with the general art of discussion. The Aristotelian-Scholastic *ars inveniendi* represents the matrix for Lull’s Art² which, like the Dialectics, was constituted as the art of finding out the Truth, and was intended to solve questions (dual questions with an affirmative or negative statement as a potential answer). Lull argued on the basis of topics or loci (which Lull called “the universals”), that is, general principles that would enable one to refute or verify the affirmations or negations (i.e. “the particulars”) able to answer such questions. Likewise, Lull intended that his Art, despite being devised specifically for the debate about faith, also be endowed with two of the most distinctive virtues of the old Dialectics: the skill of arguing about any subject and the skill of analysing the appropriateness of the principles underlying any science, two skills that would turn Lull’s Art into the art of all arts.

Following the *Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem*, Lull wrote further versions of his Art. If one reads such versions consecutively, the great effort made by the Illuminist Doctor to improve the topics and enhance its productivity in order to devise a veritable argument-elaboration machine becomes evident. Art after art, Lull proposed new loci, discontinued using some loci that he had previously proposed and improved some by simplifying them or making them more sophisticated. In any case, the loci of Art, of all Lull’s Arts, display a number of general features, a description of which is useful both to characterise what they offer to their users, and, at the same time, to explain the purpose of the many circles and tables that surprise readers when they first encounter one of the works within Lull’s superb epistemological plan.

The ultimate loci of the Art are, in every version, the figures. In the Arts, we find:

- 1] Basic circular figures, symbolised by letters (each figure brings together a series of simple principles or terms relating to a specific subject, which are also represented by letters);
- 2] Complex or combinatorial circular figures (with several concentric circles, from which, by rotating them, it is possible to generate different combinations of the simple principles or basic figures);
- 3] Tabular or combination figures, representing binary or ternary relations that can be obtained from the combinatorial mechanism represented by a complex circular figure.³

2 In Ruiz Simon, 1999, p. 27-29 and 184-238, the relation between Lull’s Art and this *ars inveniendi* is analysed.

3 Bonner, 2007, offers a suggestive introduction to the function of

Initially, the basic circular figures and the principles embraced make up the original elements used in the statements of the arguments governed by the rules of Lull’s *ars inveniendi*. These elements become meaningful, like in algebra, by means of an alphabetical notation. In the Arts prior to 1290, Lull used the entire alphabet. A, S, T, V, X, and Z symbolized figures and the sixteen letters of the Latin alphabet from B to R were used to symbolize the principles harboring such figures. In subsequent arts (wherein there are only two basic circular figures: the “first figure”, which is descended from the former figure A, and the “second figure”, descended from the former figure T) the figures become mere supports for the simple principles and the combinations of simple principles and disappear as original elements. On the other hand, new original elements appear (the questions or rules and the subjects) which, while they do not usually have the support of basic circular figures, have an alphabetical notation. In the later Arts, wherein each one of the two remainder forms is composed of nine principles, only nine letters (B-K) are used for symbolic purposes. By virtue of the number of principles that constitute the main principles, current students of Lull usually distinguish the arts belonging to the “quaternary” period (i.e. the arts prior to 1290, with figures of 16 terms: 4 x 4) from the arts belonging to the “ternary” period (i.e. the arts after 1290, with figures of 9 terms: 3 x 3).⁴ On the other hand, tabular figures present combinations of two or three original elements (in some cases, basic figures; in others, principles of the same figure or different single figures). In general, they are formed by means of the systematic combination of either these elements or letters that symbolize them (B, C, D, F, E...), which gives rise to that which Lull calls “chambers” ([BC], [BD], [BE]...). Such chambers are the schemes from which the universal-statements are formed, that is, the complex principles of the Art, the “conditions” or “maxims” by which one argues. Having appeared in a late period of Lull’s Arts, the definitions of the original elements were also included as a part of the “conditions”. Another relevant component of the artistic system is the *modi*. The “modes” are a kind of procedural or methodological rule set that indicates the most appropriate way of approaching a line of argument according to the subject and purpose.

Broadly speaking, this is the armory of “universals” that Lull put forward in the successive versions of his Arts. From

these figures in the argumentations regulated by the Art. For a more traditional introduction to this figures and the artistic mechanisms, see Carreras, 2001.

4 Pring-Mill, 1957, was the first in chronologically classifying the Arts according with this criterion.

such universals, the user can form the arguments that will enable him/her to resolve the questions. Fixing a limited number of original elements that can be easily remembered using figures and the alphabetical notation, along with the use of the combinatory, which allows the systematically discovery of all potential relationships, and enables the “compendiosness” to which the title of the first works refer. All in all, the combinatory permits the original elements, the principles of the Art, despite being “of a minimum amount”, to be said to be maximal “in power”, to use a quotation from Aristotle which perfectly describes the major virtue of the reasoning, that is to say, to be powerful because you can find a large number of arguments from only a few original elements.

The Art, which has been conceived as a technical handbook designed to offer a set of rules to enable Christian missionaries to defeat their opponents in interreligious debate, was also, from the beginning, presented tacitly as a science. According to Lull, experience dictates that people never adopt a new belief because someone dialectically demonstrates that his/her former belief is erroneous, but they will adopt the new belief only if someone demonstrates that it is right due to “necessary reasons”, in other words, if the contents of the new belief are demonstrated scientifically. The development of Lull’s Art is due, in part, to the author’s wish to improve the principles and the way that the system functions, in order to make them suitable for scientific demonstration. While the name of Lull’s first Art refers to the scholastic concept of Dialectics, the handbook in which the second version is crystallized (*Ars demonstrativa*, c. 1283) was named in such a way that the title coincided with the name of that part of the Logics (i.e. *Ars demonstrandi*) which, according to scholasticism, contained the rules for scientific knowledge, that is to say, the knowledge of principles, the rules of which were to be learnt in the *Analytica posteriora* by Aristotle. Having repeatedly stated in his first Art that his “inventiva” Art provided a technique that enabled an individual to convince using “necessary reasons” and “demonstrations”, which the Aristotelian *ars inveniendi* did not permit, the Illuminist Doctor took a step forward and, thus, in his second Art established a direct relationship between his demonstrations and the Aristotelian demonstration doctrine.⁵

In the Introduction to the *Ars demonstrativa*, Lull justified the proving character of the Art by suggesting that such an Art taught how to argue on the basis of two types of

5 See Ruiz Simon, *op. cit.*, p. 31-45, 204-208, 238-295, to link the Art and the Aristotle *ars demonstrandi*.

1 For details on specific aspects of the passage from the *Llibre de contemplació* to l’*Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem*, see Rubió, 1997.

demonstrations studied by Aristotle in *Analytica posteriora*. These demonstrations were considered by scholastics to be characteristic of science: *propter quid* (demonstrating the effect from the cause) and *quia* (demonstrating the cause from the effect). To these two types of demonstrations already known by “the ancients”, Llull added a new type of his own: *per equiparantiam* (i.e. demonstrating by comparing or establishing equalities), which, in Llull’s opinion, and in accordance with a particular interpretation of scholastic principles regarding the degree of necessity for demonstration, enabled one to reach a higher degree of certainty than using a *propter quid* demonstration, the latter being deemed more demonstrative than *quia* demonstration or, even, the only demonstration that was truly demonstrative in the strictest sense of the word.⁶

As stated above, from the very beginning, Llull presented his Art both as an *ars demonstrandi* and an *ars inveniendi*, that is to say, as being a method designed to meet scientific needs and, at the same time, to make the best use of inventive methods that characterized Dialectics using combinatory and mnemonic procedures based on figures. However, this dual nature of Llull’s Art conflicted with a deep-rooted prejudice which was characteristic of the age and its attitude to science. According to Aristotelian epistemological theories as they were interpreted by scholastics at that time – that is, in a reductionist manner – sciences were exclusively demonstrative disciplines, that is to say, disciplines which, based on a series of evident and, therefore, known principles, argued logically and reached a conclusion by means of syllogism. Such conclusions consisted of some facts, which were known as well, and the principles from which such facts were argued provided their own causes, which, in the case of demonstrative syllogisms, appeared in the middle term. Viewed from this standpoint, science did not have anything to do with the *inventio*, since the former confined itself to specifying the existing necessary relationships between a series of known facts and a series of evident principles, thus it was always doctrine, transmission or teaching of a closed nucleus of inherited truths. On the other hand, the scholastic *ars inveniendi*, i.e. the Dialectics, had nothing to do with the scientific realm, because its procedures did not provide the certainty characteristic of demonstration and they were suitable only to support opinions to a greater or lesser extent. Likewise, the assumption was that this was true, even when the Dialectics was used as an *ars artium* to discuss the principles of sciences, principles which, in

practice, and especially in the case of some subjects, such as Medicine and, obviously, Theology, did not always turn out to be as evident as was required by the theory.

Providing an Art that sought to be demonstrative and inventive at the same time, Llull presented a method that, at least theoretically, superceded the characteristically scholastic split between demonstration and heuristics. However, it was not the only innovation provided by the Art in terms of the art and science system which prevailed in Llull’s time. Taking into account that, as mentioned above, Llull’s Art was also presented, like Aristotelian dialectics, as an Art capable of dealing with any subject as well as with the principles of every science and, since, in accordance with its nature of *ars demonstrandi*, its intention was to deal scientifically with any subject or principle, the Art also looked to find a novel science which, according to Aristotelian theories, could not exist because, if it existed, it would be the universal science.

Llull’s wish to improve the efficacy of his Art as a process for discovering arguments, and his intention that such arguments correspond, increasingly, to the characteristics of demonstration, account for the evolution of Llull’s Art. The Illuminist Doctor’s reflections on the feasibility conditions for the universality of the novel science, and on the nature of the general character if its principles, also played a role in this evolution. As mentioned previously, it is customary to distinguish two periods within the evolution of Llull’s Art: the “quaternary” and the “ternary” periods, referring to the number of principles that the major figure draws together. The two aforementioned Arts, *Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem* (c. 1274) and *Ars demonstrativa* (c. 1283), belong to the first period. In short, it can be said that, according to Llull’s approach, the universality of principles related to the fact that any affirmation or negation regarding any subject entails, at the same time, an affirmation or negation concerning God, or the way in which the individual enunciating it is related to God. The first three Arts provide a series of principles governing those affirmations and negations that turn out to be pertinent concerning God and the way in which an individual must be related to Him, thereby they are universal because they enable the verification or refutation of the affirmations or negations that, respectively, concur with or contradict such principles.

However, the universality of the principles belonging to the second period is different in nature. This period starts with the *Ars inventiva veritatis* (1290), and culminates with the *Ars generalis ultima* (1305-1308) and the *Ars brevis* (1308),

which summarizes this period. Taking into consideration the function that Aristotle attributes to causality within demonstration, Llull regarded such universality by relying on a neoplatonic conception of the causal relations tacitly legitimized in both Procle’s philosophy and that of pseudo-Dionysius, a conception that enabled Llull to ontologically establish the generality of simple principles in the Art, by asserting its presence in God as the most eminent causes, as well as its effects as analogies for these causes. In his later works from the quaternary period –works that still strongly relied on the *Ars demonstrativa*– Llull began reflecting on the basis of this theory of causality, a theory that enabled him to state that every created being is composed, to a greater or lesser degree, of the divine “portraits” and the way in which his Art was demonstrative and general. In the *Ars inventiva veritatis*, the first of the ternary Arts, Llull changed the artistic mechanisms based on the results achieved during the above reflection process. The theory by Procle-Dionysius regarding the causality through the portrait enabled him to think about the principles of his Art as being principles that could be predicated univocally (according to the definition itself) for every predicable being, without implying that the differences distinguishing the subjects on which the predication is made disappear. The portrait made different beings possess the same quality, but they possessed it in a different way and to different degrees. Likewise, the type of generality of principles that supported enabled Llull to develop an Art in which the knowledge corresponded to those of the being.⁷ In the *Ars generalis ultima*, Llull fully exploits the virtues derived from this coincidence. The way in which the Illuminist Doctor portrayed his Art in the last major version exemplifies the game Llull strategically played with both the theory of Logics and the Aristotelian theory on science with the aim of legitimising his novel science, which is evident if we compare what Llull says in the preface with that stated by Aristotle in the ninth chapter of the first book of the *Analytica posteriora*. In this chapter of his *ars demonstrandi*, Aristotle refers to the best and most perfect science: a science, which, based on the general principles of every thing, is able to demonstrate the principles characteristic of the specific sciences. Also, Aristotle points out that such a science is necessary and, at the same time, impossible because the principles characteristic of each science are not apt to be demonstrated, with the exception of the principles of the secondary sciences, the verification of which relies on the primary sciences, as in the case of Perspective, which would later be verified using

Geometry. More than 16 centuries later, Llull refers to his “general science” with words that can not be accurately understood without bearing in mind those said by Aristotle, who, even considering that the “general science” was unfeasible, thought it would be the most perfect science. Like Aristotle, Llull refers to the “principles characteristic of each science”, and does so in an Aristotelian fashion, stating that each science has its own principles and, also like Aristotle, he makes a distinction between primary and secondary sciences.

According to Llull, the intellect demands and wishes for a “general science”, for the principles of specific sciences to rely on the principles of such a general science. In short, the intellect asks and yearns for a science like that described in the *Analytica posteriora*, in such terms that it is evident that Aristotle also thought that such a science, albeit impossible, would be the most appealing accomplishment. However, in Llull’s opinion, unlike that of Aristotle, this general science would not be an impossible science, but an existing science, a science that he claims to have “found”. Llull claims that, among other virtues, he is able to make the human intellect rely no longer on opinion, but on science. In fact, these are the glad tidings announced by Llull.⁸

It is evident that Llull seeks the legitimization of his epistemological glad tidings by relying on the prophecy from the Aristotelian Old Testament, the defective truths of which he claims to supercede. In his works, the Illuminist Doctor emphasises the fact that Aristotelian science contains anomalies and does not meet the needs arising from that which, anachronistically, we can refer to as “the scientific community”. The condition of Paris University, which was the main University at the time that Llull devised his method, should be borne in mind. The age in which Llull developed his Art was characterized by the condemnation from the Bishop of Paris for a large number of opinions favouring the inclusion of philosophical works by Aristotle in the syllabus of the Art Faculties. Also, it should be taken into account that, in previous centuries, in Western Latin, Aristotle had been considered exclusively to be an author of works on Logics. To summarise, at that time, the crisis of the ecclesiastical plan to build a Christian wisdom based on Aristotelian science within European Universities became evident. Likewise, it was a time when people realized that Theology and Philosophy provide “conflicting truths”. While it was fundamentally conceived as an art for interreligious debate, Llull’s Art also sought to confront this crisis. The Art

6 See *ars demonstrandi*, «From Prologue», 2, in Bonner, 1989, volume I, p. 290.

7 This change in the way of understanding the universality of the principles of Art is analysed and interpreted in Ruiz Simon, 2005.

8 Llull, 1986, p. 5-6. cf. Ruiz Simon, *op. cit.*, p. 416-422.

did not have to defeat only the “unbelievers”, but also those who, like the averroists, favoured a philosophy that was independent of theology and, hence, reached conclusions that were conflicting with the faith. In fact, Llull fought averroists with abundant literature during his last stay in Paris (1309-1311).

It was within this context that the Art was presented by Llull, who, like the neo-Augustinians of that time, opposed the secularization process promoted by the Aristotelianization of syllabuses, as an alternative to a science, the Aristotelian science, that seemingly made synchrony between Philosophy and Theology an impossible task. The absolute generality of the Art’s principles, which, therefore, were also general regarding Theology, would lead, according to the Illuminist Doctor, not only to the synchrony between Philosophy and Theology –because of the content of these principles– but also to the subordination of the former to the latter. Likewise, Llull felt that the absolute generality of the Art’s principles made feasible the foundation of Theology as a science that would not depend epistemologically on faith (i.e. this science would just provide hypotheses to be verified or refuted) but only on a series of principles, those of the Art, which would be self-evident. Precisely, because these principles were considered as being evident and, therefore, non specifically Christian, Llull presented his Art as a neutral science capable of turning the interreligious debate into a scientific matter, although, in practice, the conclusions from his demonstrative arguments always ended up verifying the hypotheses postulated by the Catholic creed and refuting all hypotheses opposing such a creed.

In summary, the Art tried to make possible all those things that, in Llull’s opinion, were necessary, notably the concordance or synchrony between Philosophy and Theology, the subordination of the former to the latter, the foundation of Theology as a true science and, last but by no means least, the conversion of Saracens. The Illuminist Doctor never stopped thinking of his Art as a tool for massive conversion, aimed at eradicating Islam and christianising the whole of humanity. In this respect, it should be kept in mind that, while his earliest work was conceived as a handbook for a school for the training of missionaries that was located in a remote and idyllic landscape, the *Ars generalis ultima* and its portable version, the *Ars brevis*, were devised as a spiritual weapon for Croats, who had to conquer using military force, within the context of a great war operation, dominions inhabited by unbelievers. However, the success of the Art in the History of Thinking relates less to these aims than to the fact that Llull’s strange epistemologic device

provided the opportunity to “decompartmentalise” the “old science” and supercede the prejudice regarding the lack of communication between the principles and the scope of the different sciences, as well as building bridges between the realm of scientific doctrine and that of the discovery of scientific knowledge.

For a number of centuries (as evidenced by the interest elicited by Llull’s writings to many authors, such as Nicolau de Cusa, Giordano Bruno, Descartes and Leibniz) Llull’s work was considered an appealing approach, from a strictly methodological viewpoint, by those who sought to supercede the old Aristotelian science. The discourses on method that inaugurated the history of Modern Philosophy tried to reconcile science with generality, as well as the invention of demonstrative judgement. For this reason, these philosophers often mentioned Llull. Some of them even referred to Llull as a forerunner or a pioneer. Others, considering that the alleged universal science was a trifling idea, said that Llull was an impostor. However, all these authors were aware that Llull’s *Ars* was the archetype, regardless of its appeal or whether it was considered to be outrageous, for the philosophical problems put forward by modern philosophers.

Transmission of the work of Ramon Llull⁹

Albert Soler Llopart

The Lullian *scriptorium*

Ramon Llull, as an author, was deeply concerned about the dissemination of his work. When it came to ensuring the transmission of his books, the fact that he was not a cleric, belonged to no religious order or university department and was not in the service of any court was a considerable obstacle. This is, without question, the reason that he dedicated so much time and effort to the issue, going so far as to develop his own production and publication system for his works, even including translation, copying and conservation. This, however, this was never centralised in a single place or within one group of people and, thus, when we speak of a Lullian *scriptorium*, it is in a functional rather than an institutional sense.

A set of collaborators, who rarely stepped out of the shadows,

9 1. This work forms part of the joint research project, CODITECAM: Llull (HUM 2005-07480-CO3-01) financed by the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science, in the Ramón Llull Documentation Centre of the University of Barcelona (Philology Department). I would like to thank Professor A. Bonner for the observations which he was kind enough to share with me.

helped the master in all these tasks: copyists, translators, even writers. Only a scant few names have been passed down through the ages. Llull’s *Vita coetanea* was written by a monk from Vauvert. Guillem Pagès, a Majorcan priest, was a faithful copyist for the Lullian cause; six manuscripts copied by him over 25 years are extant.¹⁰ In 1315, from Tunis, Llull requested the services of friar Simón de Puigcerdà, a former disciple of his, from King Jaime II of Aragon, to help him translate the books from Catalan to Latin.¹¹ We also know of a Guillem Mestres (or Mestre), regent of the *studium* of grammar in Palma de Majorca, who translated two short works by Llull from Catalan to Latin in 1316.¹²

Llull’s desire to publish part of his work in several languages is one of the most notable features of his transmission strategies. The translation and composition processes very often intermingled, as the translated texts include new elements not found in the original. Most of Llull’s work is preserved in Latin; a small but not insignificant number of texts are in both Catalan and Latin and another yet smaller number exists only in a Catalan version. The numbers speak for themselves: of some 260 written works, 57 are extant in Catalan; 20 of these are only in Catalan and the remaining 37 have versions in both Catalan and Latin. To date no work has been found in its Arabic form.¹³

While the use of Catalan, Latin and Arabic in the composition of texts remains constant over time, attention to Occitan or French as vehicles for publication seems to be concentrated mostly in the period from 1274 to 1289. At least in the case of the *Book of Evast and Blaquerna* (c. 1283), we can be certain that there was already a version in Occitan by around 1287. This was probably ordered by Llull himself, given the proximity of this date to that of the composition of the work and the use that he made of it (We know that he used it to promote a French version which was produced between 1297 and 1289, during his first stay in Paris). The misunderstanding of the Catalan original in the Occitan version demonstrates that Ramon was definitely not the translator and the same is seen in the French version: the errors in understanding in the Occitan text lead us to believe that the translator did not have a very good command of that language. Finally, we also know that during that same stay in the French capital, he arranged a translation from

10 3. Soler, 2006.

11 3. Hillgarth, 2001, docs. 48-51.

12 4. Badia, 1992, p. 157; Hillgarth, 1998, p. 178.

13 5. However, there is no question that Llull wrote Works in this language. On this topic, see Domínguez, 1993.

Occitan to Latin of the *Book of the Lover and the Beloved*, the celebrated book within a book contained in *Blaquerna*.¹⁴ Independently of these effectively preserved texts, Llull, in many works, stated his desire to produce another version of the same work. This is certainly a notable singularity within the medieval context. It is true that similar cases can be found, but perhaps none involving such a great many texts, with such a wide range of content, genres and registers, affecting such a diversity of languages and where the author himself is the direct instigator of the translations.

Llull’s methods of composition, translation and preparation of the texts for the “fair copy” have still not been studied in depth, despite there being no lack of manuscript documents to enable it.¹⁵ As far as we know, this author’s usual procedure was dictation. The scribes who copied the master’s discourse were not always the same men, or even at the same level of their profession. Sometimes they were learned men, well versed in Latin but, on other occasions, they were humbler individuals with little knowledge of the scholarly language. After the composition of the dictation, there would be a correction process in which other people, and often Llull himself, would be involved.¹⁶

There are two codices which are fundamental to the study of this production. The first, lat. 3348A in the National Library of France, is a volume given by Llull to the Charterhouse of Vauvert in 1298; it contains a draft, showing the work of various hands, of the Latin translation of the *Book of contemplation*; the author must necessarily have worked on this joint task.¹⁷ The second is the manuscript Ottob. Lat 405 in the Vatican Library, which transmits 35 works by Llull, written in Messina between May 1313 and May 1314. This is a working codex, on very rough paper, with the intervention of several cursive hands, which prepares the text for a later

14 6. Llull, 1995, P. 30-34. The same route from original composition in Catalan and dissemination in Occitan which gives rise to a French version and Latin version is followed in the case of the *Doctrina pueril* (which dates from around 1274-76), enabling us to attribute it to a decision by Llull himself; cf. Llull, 2005. For the question of the Romanesque transmission of Llull, see Badia, Santanach, Soler, in journals.

15 7. Rubió, 1928, is a pioneer work in this field. G. Pomaro promoted a line of research in this sense and the result was his research of 2005. See also the contributions of Romano, 2001 and Soler, 2005.

16 8. Pomaro, 2005, p. 186-187. However, there are versions that are contemporaneous to Llull that present a clear deficiency that indicate that the Blessed Ramón not always check them (Llull, 2001). One of them is the Catalan version of *Lógica nova* (Llull, 1998b) or the French version of *Book of the Gentil*. Rubió had suggested before that Llull left “texts not always well finished, of his own production, in his friends and pupils hands” and that sometimes he did not “check personally his works” (1957, p. 260 and 263).

17 9. Soler, 2005. More details on this work of translation are offered in the as yet unpublished study presented by G. Pomaro at the congress for the 50th anniversary of the *Raimundus-Lullus-Institut* (November 2007); it notes with caution the possibility that one of the hands involved was Llull himself.